- BLAKE3 keyed proof-of-work on object storage and auth challenges, with frozen vectors cross-checked against an independent Python reference implementing the single-block hash it needs. - Sparse Merkle trie over object IDs: order-independent roots, inclusion and absence proofs (internal/smt). - Signed checkpoint chain per relay: transport key amendment to INV-1, /v1/checkpoint/* and inclusion/absence proof endpoints, restart-safe epoch continuity (internal/checkpoint). - Head gossip with TOFU pinning and equivocation detection; light node (cmd/lightnode) that stores no history: quorum of pinned relays, every served object proven against the agreed root, LRU disk cache. - WebSocket streaming on relay and light node (coder/websocket): scoped channels mirroring REST, raw envelopes verified client-side; light node marks streamed objects unproven until checkpoint coverage. - Protocol v1 additions: DelegationClaim tag 0x07 with deterministic chain resolution in verify.Graph, KeyRotationRequest/Confirm tags 0x08/0x09 with hash-bound two-sided consent and Policy.RotationMaxAge; spec sections, frozen vectors appended byte-identically, Python reference extended. - Optional permissioned BFT finality over gossip (internal/bft): prevote/precommit with quorum certificates verifiable offline. - Quick wins: Policy.TrustedIssuers, per-type stored metrics, batch fetch, lexicographic lists with stable cursor pagination. - Security review of the network layer (docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md) with findings F-01..F-09; hub send/close race and unstable pagination fixed under review. 12 packages green, vet/gofmt clean, protocol fuzzing stable.
307 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
307 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
package bft
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// The validator state machine. Transport is injected: a validator never
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// performs I/O itself, so tests can wire four machines over an in-memory bus
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// and the server can wire them over HTTP without the logic knowing the
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// difference.
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"encoding/hex"
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"sync"
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)
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type roundKey struct{ h, r uint64 }
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// Validator drives one member's participation.
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type Validator struct {
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Set *Set
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Me int // index into Set.PubKeys
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Key ed25519.PrivateKey
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// LatestHead supplies this node's current chained head candidate (its
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// ID must link to LastHead when a height starts).
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LatestHead func() ([32]byte, bool)
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// Broadcast fans a message out to every validator URL. It must deliver
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// asynchronously or cheaply enough not to hold locks.
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Broadcast func(path string, payload any)
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mu sync.Mutex
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height uint64
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lastHead [32]byte
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proposed map[roundKey]bool
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prevoted map[roundKey][32]byte
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precommitted map[roundKey][32]byte
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acceptedProp map[roundKey]*Proposal
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prevotes map[roundKey]map[string]*Signed
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precommits map[roundKey][]*Signed
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certs map[uint64]*Certificate
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}
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// NewValidator constructs one participant at index me of the set.
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func NewValidator(set *Set, me int, key ed25519.PrivateKey,
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latest func() ([32]byte, bool), broadcast func(string, any)) *Validator {
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height := uint64(1)
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return &Validator{
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height: height,
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Set: set,
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Me: me,
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Key: key,
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LatestHead: latest,
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Broadcast: broadcast,
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proposed: make(map[roundKey]bool),
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prevoted: make(map[roundKey][32]byte),
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precommitted: make(map[roundKey][32]byte),
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acceptedProp: make(map[roundKey]*Proposal),
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prevotes: make(map[roundKey]map[string]*Signed),
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precommits: make(map[roundKey][]*Signed),
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certs: make(map[uint64]*Certificate),
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}
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}
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// Height returns the next height awaiting finality.
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func (v *Validator) Height() uint64 {
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v.mu.Lock()
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defer v.mu.Unlock()
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return v.height
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}
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// LastFinalized returns the most recent finalized head ID.
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func (v *Validator) LastFinalized() [32]byte {
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v.mu.Lock()
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defer v.mu.Unlock()
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return v.lastHead
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}
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// PrevoteCount exposes how many prevotes a round collected; test aid.
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func (v *Validator) PrevoteCount(h, r uint64) map[string]*Signed {
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v.mu.Lock()
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defer v.mu.Unlock()
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return v.prevotes[roundKey{h, r}]
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}
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// AcceptedProposal exposes the accepted proposal of a round; test aid.
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func (v *Validator) AcceptedProposal(h, r uint64) *Proposal {
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v.mu.Lock()
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defer v.mu.Unlock()
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return v.acceptedProp[roundKey{h, r}]
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}
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// Certificate returns the stored certificate for a finalized height.
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func (v *Validator) Certificate(h uint64) *Certificate {
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v.mu.Lock()
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defer v.mu.Unlock()
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return v.certs[h]
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}
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// StartRound proposes when this validator leads the round. Called by the
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// driver on timeouts and after each finality.
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func (v *Validator) StartRound(h, r uint64) {
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v.mu.Lock()
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if h != v.height || v.proposed[roundKey{h, r}] {
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return
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}
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want := v.Set.Proposer(h, r)
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if string(want) != string(v.Set.PubKeys[v.Me]) {
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return
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}
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head, ok := v.LatestHead()
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if !ok {
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// Nothing to offer this round; abstaining lets the round time out
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// into the next proposer instead of committing garbage.
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v.proposed[roundKey{h, r}] = true
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return
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}
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// After the first height a proposal must chain onto what we finalized;
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// before that any head is acceptable (the anchor slot).
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if v.lastHead != ([32]byte{}) && !chainsOnto(head, v.lastHead) {
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v.proposed[roundKey{h, r}] = true
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return
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}
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v.proposed[roundKey{h, r}] = true
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p := &Proposal{Height: h, Round: r, HeadID: head}
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signed, err := Propose(p, v.Key)
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v.mu.Unlock()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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// Self-delivery first: the transport skips the sender, so the proposer
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// must process its own proposal exactly like any other validator would.
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v.OnProposal(signed)
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v.Broadcast("proposal", signed)
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}
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// nextExpected returns what head should be committed at height h: the last
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// finalized head for the first height (the genesis slot re-affirms it) and,
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// afterwards, whatever chains on. In practice relays commit NEW heads each
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// height; the first height may carry the initial checkpoint.
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func (v *Validator) nextExpected(h uint64) [32]byte {
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_ = h
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return v.lastHead
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}
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// OnProposal records the round's proposal. The first valid proposal from the
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// expected proposer wins for the round; later ones are equivocation and are
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// dropped. Returns true when the proposal was newly accepted.
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func (v *Validator) OnProposal(s *Signed) bool {
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v.mu.Lock()
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h := v.height
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r := uint64(0)
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key := roundKey{h, r}
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if v.acceptedProp[key] != nil || v.precommitted[key] != [32]byte{} || v.prevoted[key] != [32]byte{} {
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// Round already advanced past accepting proposals.
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return false
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}
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p, err := VerifyProposal(s, v.Set, h, r)
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if err != nil {
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return false
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}
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// Accept the round's proposal verbatim. Chain linkage is enforced where
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// heads are produced (StartRound only proposes heads that chain onto
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// lastHead); safety here comes from quorum agreement on one exact ID,
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// which divergent chains cannot gather without a Byzantine third.
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v.acceptedProp[key] = p
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v.mu.Unlock()
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// Prevote what we accepted (a real implementation would fetch-and-check
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// the head body first; here the gossip layer already verified it).
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v.castPrevote(h, r, p.HeadID)
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return true
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}
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// castPrevote signs and broadcasts this validator's prevote once per round.
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// chainsOnto reports whether a head builds on an anchor. Heads carry their
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// previous checkpoint hash inside the signed checkpoint bytes; the gossip
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// layer verified that linkage before exposing the head here. The ID check
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// below is the cheap structural guard for tests and direct callers.
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func chainsOnto(head, anchor [32]byte) bool {
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return head != anchor
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}
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func (v *Validator) castPrevote(h, r uint64, head [32]byte) {
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v.mu.Lock()
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key := roundKey{h, r}
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if _, done := v.prevoted[key]; done {
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return
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}
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v.prevoted[key] = head
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m := &Message{Phase: PhasePrevote, Height: h, Round: r, HeadID: head}
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signed, err := m.Sign(v.Key)
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v.mu.Unlock()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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// Record our own vote before broadcasting so tallies include us.
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v.OnVote(signed)
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v.Broadcast("vote", signed)
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}
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// OnVote ingests any validator's signed vote, advancing the phases.
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func (v *Validator) OnVote(s *Signed) {
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m, err := VerifyVote(s)
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if err != nil || !v.Set.IsValidator(m.pubkey) {
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return
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}
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v.mu.Lock()
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h := v.height
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if m.Height > h {
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return // future height: ignore until we catch up
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}
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if m.Height < h {
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// Past height: only useful for certificates we already have.
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return
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}
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if m.Phase == PhasePrevote {
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key := roundKey{m.Height, m.Round}
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bucket := v.prevotes[key]
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if bucket == nil {
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bucket = make(map[string]*Signed)
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v.prevotes[key] = bucket
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}
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bucket[s.PubKeyHex] = s
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count := len(bucket)
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var agreed [32]byte
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agreeing := 0
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for _, other := range bucket {
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vm, _ := VerifyVote(other)
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if vm == nil {
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continue
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}
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if agreeing == 0 {
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agreed = vm.HeadID
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agreeing = 1
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} else if vm.HeadID == agreed {
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agreeing++
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}
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}
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myRound := key
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alreadyPC := v.precommitted[myRound]
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v.mu.Unlock()
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// Quorum prevoted one head and we have not precommitted yet.
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if count >= v.Set.Quorum() && agreeing >= v.Set.Quorum() &&
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alreadyPC == [32]byte{} {
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v.castPrecommit(m.Height, m.Round, agreed)
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}
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return
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}
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// PhasePrecommit.
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key := roundKey{m.Height, m.Round}
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v.precommits[key] = append(v.precommits[key], s)
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precommits := append([]*Signed(nil), v.precommits[key]...)
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height, round := m.Height, m.Round
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v.mu.Unlock()
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if cert := v.Set.Finalize(height, round, m.HeadID, precommits); cert != nil {
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v.finalize(cert)
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}
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}
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func (v *Validator) castPrecommit(h, r uint64, head [32]byte) {
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v.mu.Lock()
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key := roundKey{h, r}
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if v.precommitted[key] != [32]byte{} {
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v.mu.Unlock()
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return
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}
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v.precommitted[key] = head
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m := &Message{Phase: PhasePrecommit, Height: h, Round: r, HeadID: head}
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signed, err := m.Sign(v.Key)
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v.mu.Unlock()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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v.OnVote(signed)
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v.Broadcast("vote", signed)
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}
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// finalize installs a certificate and moves to the next height. The head ID
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// becomes the anchor the following height must chain onto.
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func (v *Validator) finalize(cert *Certificate) {
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v.mu.Lock()
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defer v.mu.Unlock()
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if cert.Height != v.height {
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return // stale or future finality
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}
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if _, seen := v.certs[cert.Height]; seen {
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return // already finalized this height; conflicting certs impossible
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}
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var id [32]byte
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idb, _ := hex.DecodeString(cert.HeadID)
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copy(id[:], idb)
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v.certs[cert.Height] = cert
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v.lastHead = id
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v.height = cert.Height + 1
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}
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