20cc52c3a5
- BLAKE3 keyed proof-of-work on object storage and auth challenges, with frozen vectors cross-checked against an independent Python reference implementing the single-block hash it needs. - Sparse Merkle trie over object IDs: order-independent roots, inclusion and absence proofs (internal/smt). - Signed checkpoint chain per relay: transport key amendment to INV-1, /v1/checkpoint/* and inclusion/absence proof endpoints, restart-safe epoch continuity (internal/checkpoint). - Head gossip with TOFU pinning and equivocation detection; light node (cmd/lightnode) that stores no history: quorum of pinned relays, every served object proven against the agreed root, LRU disk cache. - WebSocket streaming on relay and light node (coder/websocket): scoped channels mirroring REST, raw envelopes verified client-side; light node marks streamed objects unproven until checkpoint coverage. - Protocol v1 additions: DelegationClaim tag 0x07 with deterministic chain resolution in verify.Graph, KeyRotationRequest/Confirm tags 0x08/0x09 with hash-bound two-sided consent and Policy.RotationMaxAge; spec sections, frozen vectors appended byte-identically, Python reference extended. - Optional permissioned BFT finality over gossip (internal/bft): prevote/precommit with quorum certificates verifiable offline. - Quick wins: Policy.TrustedIssuers, per-type stored metrics, batch fetch, lexicographic lists with stable cursor pagination. - Security review of the network layer (docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md) with findings F-01..F-09; hub send/close race and unstable pagination fixed under review. 12 packages green, vet/gofmt clean, protocol fuzzing stable.
344 lines
10 KiB
Go
344 lines
10 KiB
Go
package verify_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"git.n1ko.dev/Niko/niko_trust/internal/identity/signer"
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"git.n1ko.dev/Niko/niko_trust/internal/protocol"
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"git.n1ko.dev/Niko/niko_trust/internal/tce"
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"git.n1ko.dev/Niko/niko_trust/internal/transport"
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"git.n1ko.dev/Niko/niko_trust/internal/verify"
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"git.n1ko.dev/Niko/niko_trust/internal/address"
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)
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const base = uint64(1_700_000_000)
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func env(t *testing.T, tceBytes, sig []byte) *transport.Envelope {
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t.Helper()
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return &transport.Envelope{TCE: tceBytes, Signature: sig}
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}
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func TestTrustedWithoutApproval(t *testing.T) {
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issuer, _ := signer.Generate()
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subject, _ := signer.Generate()
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c := &protocol.Claim{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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Subject: subject.Public(),
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Claims: map[string]tce.Value{"admin": tce.Bool(true)},
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CreatedAt: base - 100,
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Serial: 1,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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cb, _ := protocol.EncodeClaim(c)
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g := verify.NewGraph()
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if err := g.Add(env(t, cb, issuer.Sign(cb))); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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res := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{
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Subject: subject.Address(),
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Predicate: "admin",
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Now: base + 10,
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})
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if !res.Trusted {
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t.Fatalf("expected trusted, got %q", res.Reason)
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}
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if res.Issuer.String() != issuer.Address().String() {
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t.Fatal("issuer mismatch")
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}
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}
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func TestRevocationWins(t *testing.T) {
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issuer, _ := signer.Generate()
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subject, _ := signer.Generate()
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c := &protocol.Claim{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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Subject: subject.Public(),
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Claims: map[string]tce.Value{"admin": tce.Bool(true)},
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CreatedAt: base - 100,
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Serial: 1,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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cb, _ := protocol.EncodeClaim(c)
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id := tce.ComputeID(cb).String()
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rv := &protocol.Revocation{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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ClaimID: tce.ComputeID(cb),
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Reason: "mistake",
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CreatedAt: base,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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rvb, _ := protocol.EncodeRevocation(rv)
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g := verify.NewGraph()
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if err := g.Add(env(t, cb, issuer.Sign(cb))); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := g.Add(env(t, rvb, issuer.Sign(rvb))); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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res := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{Subject: subject.Address(), Predicate: "admin", Now: base + 10})
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if res.Trusted || !res.Revoked {
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t.Fatalf("expected revoked, got trusted=%v revoked=%v (%s)", res.Trusted, res.Revoked, res.Reason)
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}
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_ = id
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}
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func TestApprovalRequired(t *testing.T) {
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issuer, _ := signer.Generate()
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approver, _ := signer.Generate()
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subject, _ := signer.Generate()
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c := &protocol.Claim{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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Subject: subject.Public(),
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Claims: map[string]tce.Value{"admin": tce.Bool(true)},
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CreatedAt: base - 100,
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Serial: 1,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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cb, _ := protocol.EncodeClaim(c)
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// Request from the issuer to the approver.
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req := &protocol.ApprovalRequest{
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Sender: issuer.Public(),
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Recipient: approver.Public(),
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Action: "admin",
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Message: "please approve admin",
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CreatedAt: base,
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ExpiresAt: base + 30,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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reqb, _ := protocol.EncodeApprovalRequest(req)
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reqID := tce.ComputeID(reqb).String()
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resp := &protocol.ApprovalResponse{
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RequestHash: tce.ComputeID(reqb),
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Responder: approver.Public(),
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Decision: protocol.Allow,
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CreatedAt: base + 5,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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respb, _ := protocol.EncodeApprovalResponse(resp)
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approvers := []address.Address{approver.Address()}
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g := verify.NewGraph()
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g.Add(env(t, cb, issuer.Sign(cb)))
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g.Add(env(t, reqb, issuer.Sign(reqb)))
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g.Add(env(t, respb, approver.Sign(respb)))
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// Without the response the claim is not trusted (approval required).
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missing := verify.NewGraph()
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missing.Add(env(t, cb, issuer.Sign(cb)))
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missing.Add(env(t, reqb, issuer.Sign(reqb)))
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r0 := missing.Evaluate(verify.Policy{Subject: subject.Address(), Predicate: "admin", Approvers: approvers, Now: base + 10})
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if r0.Trusted {
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t.Fatal("expected untrusted without approval response")
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}
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// With the response it is trusted and approved by the approver.
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r1 := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{Subject: subject.Address(), Predicate: "admin", Approvers: approvers, Now: base + 10})
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if !r1.Trusted {
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t.Fatalf("expected trusted with approval, got %q", r1.Reason)
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}
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if r1.ApprovedBy.String() != approver.Address().String() {
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t.Fatalf("approved by %s, want %s", r1.ApprovedBy, approver.Address())
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}
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_ = reqID
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_ = time.Now
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}
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func TestApprovalThreshold(t *testing.T) {
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issuer, _ := signer.Generate()
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a1, _ := signer.Generate()
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a2, _ := signer.Generate()
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subject, _ := signer.Generate()
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c := &protocol.Claim{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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Subject: subject.Public(),
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Claims: map[string]tce.Value{"admin": tce.Bool(true)},
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CreatedAt: base - 100,
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Serial: 1,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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cb, _ := protocol.EncodeClaim(c)
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approvers := []address.Address{a1.Address(), a2.Address()}
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// closure returning objects to add
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pair := func(approver *signer.Signer) (*transport.Envelope, *transport.Envelope) {
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req := &protocol.ApprovalRequest{
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Sender: issuer.Public(),
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Recipient: approver.Public(),
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Action: "admin",
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CreatedAt: base,
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ExpiresAt: base + 30,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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reqb, _ := protocol.EncodeApprovalRequest(req)
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resp := &protocol.ApprovalResponse{
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RequestHash: tce.ComputeID(reqb),
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Responder: approver.Public(),
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Decision: protocol.Allow,
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CreatedAt: base + 5,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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respb, _ := protocol.EncodeApprovalResponse(resp)
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return env(t, reqb, issuer.Sign(reqb)), env(t, respb, approver.Sign(respb))
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}
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g := verify.NewGraph()
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g.Add(env(t, cb, issuer.Sign(cb)))
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r1, rp1 := pair(a1)
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g.Add(r1)
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g.Add(rp1)
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// Only one of two approvers has answered; threshold 2 -> not trusted.
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r0 := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{Subject: subject.Address(), Predicate: "admin", Approvers: approvers, Threshold: 2, Now: base + 10})
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if r0.Trusted {
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t.Fatal("expected untrusted with only one approval at threshold 2")
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}
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// Both approve -> trusted, both listed.
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r2, rp2 := pair(a2)
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g.Add(r2)
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g.Add(rp2)
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r1b := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{Subject: subject.Address(), Predicate: "admin", Approvers: approvers, Threshold: 2, Now: base + 10})
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if !r1b.Trusted || len(r1b.ApprovedByAll) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected trusted with 2 approvals, got trusted=%v approvers=%d", r1b.Trusted, len(r1b.ApprovedByAll))
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}
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}
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func TestApprovalWithdrawal(t *testing.T) {
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issuer, _ := signer.Generate()
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approver, _ := signer.Generate()
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subject, _ := signer.Generate()
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c := &protocol.Claim{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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Subject: subject.Public(),
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Claims: map[string]tce.Value{"admin": tce.Bool(true)},
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CreatedAt: base - 100,
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Serial: 1,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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cb, _ := protocol.EncodeClaim(c)
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req := &protocol.ApprovalRequest{
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Sender: issuer.Public(),
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Recipient: approver.Public(),
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Action: "admin",
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CreatedAt: base,
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ExpiresAt: base + 30,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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reqb, _ := protocol.EncodeApprovalRequest(req)
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resp := &protocol.ApprovalResponse{
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RequestHash: tce.ComputeID(reqb),
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Responder: approver.Public(),
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Decision: protocol.Allow,
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CreatedAt: base + 5,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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respb, _ := protocol.EncodeApprovalResponse(resp)
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respID := tce.ComputeID(respb).String()
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approvers := []address.Address{approver.Address()}
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g := verify.NewGraph()
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g.Add(env(t, cb, issuer.Sign(cb)))
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g.Add(env(t, reqb, issuer.Sign(reqb)))
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g.Add(env(t, respb, approver.Sign(respb)))
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if r := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{Subject: subject.Address(), Predicate: "admin", Approvers: approvers, Now: base + 10}); !r.Trusted {
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t.Fatal("expected trusted before withdrawal")
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}
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// Approver revokes their own response object.
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rv := &protocol.Revocation{
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Issuer: approver.Public(),
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ClaimID: tce.ComputeID(respb),
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Reason: "changed my mind",
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CreatedAt: base + 6,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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rvb, _ := protocol.EncodeRevocation(rv)
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g.Add(env(t, rvb, approver.Sign(rvb)))
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_ = respID
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if r := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{Subject: subject.Address(), Predicate: "admin", Approvers: approvers, Now: base + 10}); r.Trusted {
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t.Fatal("expected untrusted after approval withdrawal")
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}
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}
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func TestRejectsBadSignature(t *testing.T) {
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issuer, _ := signer.Generate()
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impostor, _ := signer.Generate()
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c := &protocol.Claim{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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Subject: issuer.Public(),
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Claims: map[string]tce.Value{"x": tce.Bool(true)},
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CreatedAt: base - 100,
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Serial: 1,
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Nonce: make([]byte, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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cb, _ := protocol.EncodeClaim(c)
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g := verify.NewGraph()
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if err := g.Add(env(t, cb, impostor.Sign(cb))); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected Add to reject bad signature")
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}
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}
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func TestTrustedIssuersFilter(t *testing.T) {
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good, _ := signer.Generate()
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bad, _ := signer.Generate()
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subject, _ := signer.Generate()
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g := verify.NewGraph()
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addClaim := func(issuer *signer.Signer, nonce byte) {
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t.Helper()
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c := &protocol.Claim{
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Issuer: issuer.Public(),
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Subject: subject.Public(),
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Claims: map[string]tce.Value{"mod": tce.Bool(true)},
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CreatedAt: base - 100,
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Serial: 1,
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Nonce: bytes.Repeat([]byte{nonce}, tce.NonceSize),
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}
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cb, _ := protocol.EncodeClaim(c)
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if err := g.Add(env(t, cb, issuer.Sign(cb))); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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}
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addClaim(bad, 0x11)
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// With the filter, the untrusted claim does not satisfy the policy.
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res := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{
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Subject: subject.Address(),
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Predicate: "mod",
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Now: base + 10,
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TrustedIssuers: []address.Address{good.Address()},
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})
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if res.Trusted || res.Issuer.String() != "" && res.Issuer.IsZero() == false {
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t.Fatalf("untrusted issuer accepted: %+v", res)
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}
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// The same claim satisfies once its issuer is trusted.
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addClaim(good, 0x12)
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res2 := g.Evaluate(verify.Policy{
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Subject: subject.Address(),
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Predicate: "mod",
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Now: base + 10,
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TrustedIssuers: []address.Address{good.Address()},
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})
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if !res2.Trusted || res2.Issuer.String() != good.Address().String() {
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t.Fatalf("trusted issuer rejected: %q", res2.Reason)
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}
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}
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