niko_trust/docs/API.md

HTTP API

Base path: /v1. Transport is JSON. Requests and responses are transport.Envelope objects (see docs/PROTOCOL.md).

Authentication

Read endpoints require a session token. Obtain one with the challenge/assert handshake (AuthAssertion bound to the server's audience):

POST /v1/auth/challenge          -> { "challenge": "<hex>" }
POST /v1/auth/assert  (envelope) -> { "session_token", "identity", "scope" }

Send the token as Authorization: Bearer <token> or ?token=<token>. A session is valid for 30 minutes; each challenge is single-use and expires after 5 minutes. Scopes: read:claims, read:requests, read:responses, read:revocations, plus the generic read / *.

Rate limit: POST /v1/auth/challenge is capped at 30/min per IP (429).

Endpoints

Method	Path	Auth	Query / body	Purpose
POST	/v1/objects	none	Envelope body	Store a signed object (claim/request/...)
GET	/v1/objects/{id}	none	—	Fetch one object by content id
GET	/v1/objects?ids=a,b,c	none	≤100 ids	Batch fetch; missing ids are omitted
GET	/v1/claims	session	subject, limit,offset	Claims about a subject
GET	/v1/requests	session	recipient,limit,offset	Approval requests to a recipient
GET	/v1/responses	session	request,limit,offset	Responses to a request
GET	/v1/revocations	session	claim,limit,offset	Revocations targeting a claim
GET	/v1/config	none	—	{ "audience": "..." }
GET	/v1/metrics	none	—	Prometheus-style metrics
GET	/v1/ws	session	WebSocket control frames	Live stream of newly stored envelopes
GET	/v1/healthz	none	—	Liveness (200)
GET	/v1/readyz	none	—	Readiness (200 / 503)

WebSocket streaming (GET /v1/ws)

Authenticate like any read endpoint (bearer token; browsers may use ?token=). The token's scopes gate channels exactly as the REST list endpoints do: read:claims, read:requests, read:responses, read:revocations, or the generic read/*.

After connecting, send JSON text frames:

{ "op": "subscribe", "channel": "claims", "key": "<subject address>" }
{ "op": "unsubscribe", "channel": "claims", "key": "..." }

Channels mirror the list endpoints: claims (by subject), requests (by recipient), responses (by request hash), revocations (by claim id). Every newly stored object on a subscribed channel arrives as:

{ "event": "object", "channel": "...", "key": "...",
  "object_id": "...", "envelope": { "tce": "...", "signature": "..." } }

The envelope is raw and unverified by design: verify it locally exactly as if you had fetched it yourself. Limits: ≤16 subscriptions per connection; a client that cannot keep up is disconnected rather than allowed to stall broadcasts; the session's 30-minute lifetime applies mid-stream.

Storing objects (POST /v1/objects)

• The relay does not verify the signature (see docs/TRUST-MODEL.md); verification is the verifier's job. Any well-formed envelope is stored.
• Idempotent: replaying the same object returns the same object_id with 200 and creates no duplicate.
• Body cap: the request body is limited to MaxClaimTCE*2 + 1024 bytes (~9 KiB). Larger bodies get 413.
• Per-subject quota: a subject may hold at most 1000 claims. The 1001st distinct claim returns 422 (subject quota exceeded).
• One response per request: a second ApprovalResponse for an already answered request returns 422 (request already answered).
• Rate limit: 60/min per IP (429).

Request / response shape:

POST { "tce": "<base64>", "signature": "<base64>" }
200 { "object_id": "<content-id>" }
422 { "error": "server: subject ... quota exceeded" }
413 { "error": "payload too large" }
429 { "error": "rate limited" }

Listing endpoints (claims/requests/responses/revocations)

All require a session with the matching read:* scope and return a JSON object with a single list key (claims, requests, responses, revocations). Each entry is a raw Envelope ({ "tce": "<base64>", "signature": "<base64>" }); decode the TCE to read the issuer/subject/fields.

• subject / recipient / request / claim is required; omitting it is 400.
• Pagination: results are ordered lexicographically by content id.
  • limit (max items, 0 = no cap) and offset (skip) query params. Example: ?subject=trust1def&limit=10&offset=20.
  • after=<object_id> is the stable cursor: only ids greater than it are returned. Prefer it over offset — offset shifts when objects are inserted concurrently, a cursor does not.
• Missing/invalid scope is 403; missing token is 401.

Health & metrics

• GET /v1/healthz → 200 { "status": "ok" }.
• GET /v1/readyz → 200 { "status": "ready" }, or 503 if not ready.
• GET /v1/metrics → text/plain Prometheus exposition with at least: trust_objects_stored, trust_objects_rejected, trust_challenges_issued, trust_assertions_ok, trust_assertions_failed, trust_sessions_active, trust_ws_connections, trust_ws_messages_sent, and one trust_objects_stored_<type> counter per object type.

Status code summary

Code	Meaning
200	OK / stored / fetched
400	Malformed request (bad envelope, missing param)
401	Missing/invalid auth token or assertion
403	Token present but insufficient scope
404	Unknown object id
413	Request body exceeds the size cap
422	Well-formed but rejected (quota / already answered)
429	Rate limit exceeded
503	Server not ready

Configuration

The server is configured from a YAML file (default config.yaml), with command-line flags overriding individual keys. A missing config.yaml is not an error: the server runs with built-in defaults. Copy config.yaml.example to get started.

listen_addr: ":8080"        # HTTP listen address
audience: "trust.n1ko.dev"  # audience bound into auth assertions
data_dir: ""                # "" = in-memory; a path persists objects to disk
log_level: "info"           # debug | info | warn | error

put_limit: 60               # POST /v1/objects per window, per IP
put_window: "1m"
challenge_limit: 30         # POST /v1/auth/challenge per window, per IP
challenge_window: "1m"
max_per_subject: 1000       # claim cap per subject address
challenge_ttl: "5m"         # auth challenge validity
session_ttl: "30m"          # verified session validity
max_body_bytes: 9216        # hard request-body cap

Flags: -config <path> (default config.yaml), -addr, -audience, -data (any of these overrides the file).